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The article is devoted to the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution 
stimulating values and behavioural patterns in a secular setting, which – 
although invariably focused on God and making references to the sacred 
– are often different in Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy. The 
article also considers how Russian Orthodoxy contributed to the shaping 
of a distinct vision of the social order, structures, mentality and attitudes.
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СОцІАльНІ КОНтеКСтИ ПрАВОСлАВ’Я
У статті розглядається проблема церкви (російського 
православ’я) як інституту, що здійснює цінності та зразки поведін-
ки у світському контексті їхнього виникнення, які побудовані людьми 
довкола Бога та, незважаючи на відкликання до священного, часто 
відрізняються у різних віросповіданнях: католицизмі, протестантиз-
мі та православ’ї. Також тому, наскільки російське православ’я фор-
мувало бачення соціального світу, менталітет, структури, соціальні 
настанови, які відрузняються від двох інших віросповідань.
Ключові слова: православ’я, сакралізація світу, Третій Рим, зі-
ткнення цивілізацій.
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СОцИАльНые КОНтеКСты ПрАВОСлАВИЯ
В статье рассматривается проблема церкви (русского правосла-
вия) как института, что несет в себе ценности и поведенческие мо-
дели в светском контексте их возникновения, что выстроенные во-
круг Бога людьми, несмотря на ссылки на их святость, часто разные 
в отдельных конфессиях: католицизме, протестантизме и правосла-
вии. А также потому, насколько русское православие формировало 
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отличные от двух остальных вероисповеданий представления о со-
циальном мире, менталитет, структуры и подходы.
Ключевые слова: православие, сакрализация мира, Третий Рим, 
столкновение цивилизаций. 
Over a thousand years ago, it was impossible to predict that the de­
cision to adopt Christianity from Rome, as was the case in Bohemia 
or Poland, or from Byzantium, a choice made by Kievan Rus’, would 
have such tremendous cultural consequences. Nor could it have been 
foreseen that it would divide Europe in general, and its Slavic regions in 
particular, into two different cultural circles or even, as viewed by Fe­
liks Koneczny, Samuel Huntington and a number of Russian academics, 
two civilisations. The paths within the East Slavic community itself also 
diverged to a great extent, although the process did not always produce 
lasting results. In the course of time, the area came to display increas­
ingly more distinct and more important cultural, political, mental and 
religious differences within the Orthodox world: while the Grand Duchy 
of Moscow became orientalised, the societies of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania and the Polish­Lithuanian Commonwealth which, at a later 
date, were to form Ukraine and Belarus became westernised.
It could therefore be said that the sense of a separate Russian cultural 
identity, often emphasised by the Russians themselves, was shaped by 
factors such as a prolonged isolation of Russia from the West, the influ­
ence of non­Indo­European value systems, the Tatar rule, and, last but 
not least, the emergence of the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome. This 
distinct Russian identity, with its attendant sense of pride in the power 
of the steadily expanding state, was constructed in constant opposition 
to the West, treated as a reference group (in the sociological sense). This 
tendency, already visible in the seventeenth century, became common in 
the times of Peter I. By contrast, Russia was never a point of reference 
for Western Europe, and Western Europeans never formed their identity 
in constant comparison with Russia and Russianness. 
1. The sacral dimension of rus’ness
The concept of Moscow as the Third Rome was proposed in the early 
sixteenth century by Philotheus, a monk at the Pskov monastery. What­
ever his intentions, in the course of time the idea exerted an enormous 
influence on the shape and form of the Russian state in terms of its cul­
ture, religion and politics: the Russian Tsardom came to be perceived as 
the only and the last Christian state, with the Russian rulers destined to 
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assume the leadership of the Christian world until the Second Coming 
of Christ. Following the reforms introduced by Peter I, this messianic 
dimension of the Russian idea of the Third Rome came to be replaced 
by a missionist idea of a universal and secular empire serving the com­
mon good. 
Thus, between the sixteenth and eighteenth century Russia embraced 
its two fundamental concepts and sets of values, which became the de­
cisive factors shaping the development Russianness in the centuries to 
come, and are still visible today. Firstly, Orthodoxy, consolidated by the 
messianic idea of the Third Rome, came to provide a set of constitutive 
values which defined a Russian (русский) in terms of culture and men­
tality, set the limits of Russianness, created Russian visions of the world 
and built the social capital. As such, its impact extended also to the po­
litical sphere. Secondly, Peter I’s secular missionist idea was to build an 
empire whose subjects would no longer be the ethnic Rus’ people, but 
Russians, regardless of their ethnicity or religion – a concept following, 
to a certain extent, the example of European political nations. 
Although over the course of Russian history the paths of the two con­
cepts have sometimes diverged and sometimes converged, the messianic 
spirituality stemming from Orthodoxy has always been intertwined with 
the missionist conviction of Russia’s grandeur. Even if contrary to the 
facts, Russia, as seen by the Russians, has always been great and is in­
deed predestined for its grandeur, considering its culture, spiritual depth, 
political power and its sense of a mission going back to the concept of 
the Third Rome and the great empire of Peter I. In this approach, Rus­
sians perceive themselves to be a special nation. Today’s Russian elites 
are trying to convince the West that the great Russian culture brings 
a universal message to the world. Andrzej Nowak argues that, in the 
spirit of Philotheus, some Russian intellectual circles are currently at­
tempting to consolidate the imperial dimension of their country in a bid 
to protect its cultural identity from the Western menace. This can be 
seen as yet another Russian attempt to bring salvation to the world [12, 
pp. 136­137]. 
While The West saw the medieval idea of Respublica Christiana sec­
ularised in the Renaissance and was ultimately to experience the birth of 
nation states, in the East the process of transformation of the Tsardom 
of Muscovy into the Russian Empire took an entirely different course. 
Indeed, Mykola Riabchuk observes that ‘[h]ere, the pre­modern Slavia 
Orthodoxa became a part of the imperial narration and the newly es­
tablished empire was synectically identified with the mythical «Rus’», 
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which came to signify not only a religious, but also an ethnic, territorial 
and political community. Thus, the empire acquired a sacred dimen­
sion while the Slavia Orthodoxa was nationalised. For the empire, this 
meant a petrification of the pre­modern frame of thought and structure 
of government; for Orthodoxy, a fatal stagnation in the archaic forms 
of caesaropapism, which until today involves a peculiar combination of 
politically inspired megalomania with aggressive messianism disguised 
in the cloak of a construct referred to as «russkii mir». The replacement 
of confessional­civilisational «Rus’ness» with ethnopolitical «Russian­
ness», along with utterly unfortunate misunderstandings stemming from 
the fact, have considerably hindered the formation of modern national 
identities, not only Ukrainian and Belarusian, but also Russian’ [15, 
p. 363­364]. 
The Russian­Rus’ community, which, as viewed by Russians, in­
cludes also Ukrainians and Belarusians, is sometimes compared to Mus­
lim ummah (Besançon, Riabczuk): the sacred space of its hard core is 
surrounded by a borderland zone, with areas outside remaining to be 
conquered. Thus, there are no limits to expansion, just as there are no 
limits to the expansion of the Church. The Russian Orthodox Church 
combines ‘the ecclesiastical element, the patriarchate, and the element 
of force: the state. The Russian state is Orthodox, i.e. the Orthodox 
Church is fully integrated with its structure’ [2, p. 4]. Considering the 
constitutive mechanism of the state, the nature of its community and 
common cultural bond, Besançon has often remarked that Russia is not 
a state, but a Church. It is a Church which has integrated a ‘natural’, as 
it were, tendency for expansion, and demands that others should accept 
its faith (a considerable proportion of Russians, including academics, 
believe that all Slavs should be Orthodox and Poles are Catholic traitors 
of the Slavic people). In much the same vein, in the twentieth century, 
communism acquired a similarly religious dimension in the Russian 
context, and Russia attempted to save the world by spreading the new 
communist faith. 
Russian vagueness about their country’s borders and the borders of 
Russianness as such stems from three factors: the history of expansion 
of the Russian state (a phenomenon unparalleled, for reasons of avail­
able space, in the western European context), the perception of Russia in 
terms of a potentially expanding Church (ever since the idea of Moscow 
as the Third Rome), and the Russian understanding of state and state 
borders, which was adopted from the Tatars, who had imposed their 
political categories on Moscow Rus’ for over two centuries. 
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Arguably, Russians, in their own eyes, did not conquer and enslave 
others, like the British or French, but brought truth to the world, the 
truth enabling the unification of all Orthodox people into the true and 
universal Church. A similar religious principle operated also in the case 
of communism, perceived in terms of the one and only ideology able 
to unite all those suffering from class oppression. Thus, Russian com­
munists spread good, truth and ideological salvation. In this way, the 
religious Orthodox messianism of Rus’ as the Third Rome was replaced 
with communist and internationalist missionism of sacralised atheism of 
the twentieth century. 
In other words, Russia has the right to be (whatever the verb ‘to be’ 
is taken to mean) in any area which is or at one time was Orthodox, com­
munist, or conquered by the Russian army. In much the same way, the 
Tatar state, or at least a sense of legitimate possession of a territory, was 
wherever there was the Tatar army. Like the Chinese, who try to legiti­
mise their claims to Tibet, the Russians also assert their right to return 
(either directly or by establishing a sphere of their interests) to territories 
they once controlled. Such imperial­militarist mentality, coupled with 
messianism and a sense of a mission to spread the only true idea served 
the Russians to sacralise both themselves and their military conquests. 
As Alain Besançon observes ‘[t]he attribute of holiness, which once 
belonged to the Orthodox Church and from there was transferred onto 
the tsar, came to belong also to Russia as such. However, unlike in the 
case of any other nationalism, this attribution does not involve a privi­
leged ethnic group in an abstract sense. Here, the light of the sacred 
shines on everything Russian, everything that is in any way connected 
with the country. Russia has become an object of worship, or even the 
sole object of worship. The list of things sacred is endless’ [4, p. 63]. 
Here, Besançon lists the language, literature, landscape, objects of ev­
eryday use, customs, icons, liturgy, and also ‘Christ and the Holy Spirit, 
who became nationalised, as they are seen to have been properly un­
derstood only by the Eastern Church and Russian Orthodoxy, which 
considers itself their guardian [4, p. 64]. In the world of this practically 
holy and undoubtedly great Russian nation (великий русский народ), 
the expansion from Alaska to Warsaw is considered to be a natural ac­
tivity of the state, which sees itself either as the Third Rome or its more 
secular Soviet incarnation (the USSR and its internationalist ideology). 
Such expansion, then, is ‘not a conquest but unification’ [4, p. 50]. It is 
even more natural in the case of ‘collecting the lands of Rus’’, treated by 
the Russians nearly as the right they received from God himself.
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2. features of russian orthodoxy
Any discussion of the social dimension of Russian Orthodoxy car­
ried out from the point of view of Western standards involves the risk 
of adopting a judgmental (‘better­worse’) attitude. Regrettably, such at­
titudes can be found on both sides of the eastern EU border. Societies in 
this part of Europe vary considerably, but their differences should not 
be subject to judgmental evaluation in academic discourse. Although 
Orthodoxy brings about different social consequences than Catholicism 
or Protestantism, the present discussion perceives difference only in de­
scriptive terms and not in terms of evaluative judgment. Below, I offer 
a brief presentation (inevitably simplified because of our limited space 
here) of at least some characteristic features of Russian Orthodoxy. 
(1) Under the influence of such historical factors as the Tatar rule, the 
idea of the Third Rome and the reforms of Peter I, Russian Orthodoxy, 
interpreted as a civilization (a view often shared by the Russians them­
selves), developed a sense of community which separates itself from 
others and displays the mentality of a besieged fortress. It is character­
ised by a strong tradition of sacralisation of its own difference, a con­
viction of its own cultural and religious superiority, clearly developed 
imperialist and expansionist attitudes, and, consequently, a messianic­
missionary mentality. All these features are combined with a tendency 
to perceive the world in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This tendency, rela­
tively much stronger than in Western Europe, stems from a prolonged 
tradition of Russian isolationism (which at some point involved also 
physical isolation of foreigners in the country) and a distinctly different 
character of the tsarist state, particularly in the period prior to Peter I 
and the Age of Enlightenment.1 Russian isolationism and a dichotomic 
vision of the world got a new lease of life under the Soviet Union, at that 
stage the world’s only communist country (hence, traditional distrust of 
foreigners, division into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and a peculiar spy mania). To a 
lesser extent, such attitudes continued after the second World War until 
the fall of the communist state, and linger on today. This has always 
1 ‘Inherited from the Mongols, the concept of the border as a barrier which 
is forbidden to cross in either direction acquires also a religious meaning; 
the border becomes a wall protecting purity and is thus consolidated even 
further. The few foreign traders who managed to get across were placed 
in a separate district and put under strict surveillance’ [4. p. 40]. Similar 
procedures in the case of foreigners were applied also in communist China 
(even after Mao’s death) and are still in place in North Korea.
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been a markedly anti­Western phenomenon, and it still looms over Rus­
sian politics and influences attitudes of the Russians today. 
(2) Orthodoxy has been characterised by its highly developed spiri­
tual, mystical and contemplative dimension. At the same time, the divi­
sion between the spiritual, metaphysical sphere of ideas and the sphere 
of social reality and methodological principles in humanities and social 
studies is weaker than in Catholicism. As Jerzy Klinger observes ‘[i]
mportantly, most Orthodox theologians today are convinced that the es­
sence of the Church eludes any attempted definitions of any kind’ [9, p. 
160]. Unlike in the West, the culture of discourse in Orthodox societies 
is not based on the scholastic tradition, a fact of considerable social con­
sequences. The Orthodox East is not as rational as the West (although 
it has to be noted that the criteria of rationality were constructed in the 
West). Irena Borowik argues that ‘Orthodox adogmatism does not acti­
vate the mechanism of rationalisation, as is the case in Catholicism. The 
Catholic Church, which has an entire class of priests at its disposal (…), 
makes a conscious effort to achieve (…) a coherence between its reli­
gious doctrine and social reality’ [5, p. 19]. The Orthodox world is more 
emotional, more focused on contacts within primary groups, relies more 
on oral and rural culture, and tends to concentrate on the here and now 
(since change is often revolutionary). On the other hand, Catholicism 
and Protestantism are more open to constant change, innovation and 
transformation of the social order. Also, Eastern Christianity is given 
to visionary (mythopoeic) explanations rather than to scientific social 
theories providing a framework structuring a vision of the world on a 
macro and micro scale. Such an attitude is reflected not only in essay­
ist and ‘academic’ literature of this cultural circle, often (particularly 
in Russia) saturated with visionary historical interpretations (involving 
historical conspiracy theories far more frequently than in the West), but 
also in anti­modernist practice of everyday social life, both among the 
elites and in the entire society.2 ‘Antidogmatism, an aversion to ratio­
nality and speculative thinking, can be identified as one of the reasons 
for the inability to identify fundamental contradictions between com­
munist ideology and Orthodox doctrine’ [5. p. 29]. Thus, the Orthodox 
2 Alain Besançon writes: ‘While it is true that Russian academic achie­
ve ment in science is impressive, it is certainly mediocre in humanities, as 
seen from the perspective of the last two hundred years. (…) The adopted 
«German model» limited and intellectually impoverished the academic stu­
dy almost as effectively as communism did at a later date’ [3, p. P31].
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Church succumbed to the new communist power far more easily than its 
Catholic counterpart. At the same time, as has often been noticed, in the 
Russian social context communism came to play the role of religion, in 
which idealist missionism replaced religious messianism. 
(3) The extent to which Russian Orthodoxy has been affected by cae­
saropapism, both in the political and a broader socio­cultural sense, can­
not be underestimated. The Orthodox church served to provide religious 
sanction to the political authority, while remaining strictly subordinated 
to the monarchy in the theological and dogmatic as well as the institu­
tional sphere. The Church structures, incorporated into the administra­
tive power structure of the Russian state by Peter I, facilitated control 
of the population. Consequently, unlike in Catholicism, the elites of the 
Orthodox Church were not in a position to act as a counterbalance or 
partner to the ruler. This situation was exacerbated by the low level of 
formation among the Orthodox clergy, particularly its lower echelons, 
which resulted in low esteem of village priests in the local community. 
The position of the Orthodox Church within the power system consoli­
dated vertical rather than horizontal social structures and social bonds. 
Its subordination to the tsarist rule entailed inability to pursue emancipa­
tion from the spiritual and political centre of the country: the Orthodox 
clergy (unlike its Catholic counterpart in a number of European coun­
tries) did not initiate autonomous national tendencies among Ukrainians 
and Belarusians. Quite on the contrary, it was often the case that they 
were their active opponents. In the last decades of the Russian Empire, 
Orthodox priests were an extension of political power and supported 
Russian nationalist tendencies as requested by the authorities. Wherever 
the Orthodox Church remains independent from the political (particular­
ly Russian) authorities, it has generally been indifferent to the national 
question and remained focused on its religious service; at the same time, 
it usually tries to be loyal to the authorities (as can be currently observed 
in the Białystok region). 
(4) Unlike Western Churches, the Orthodox Church generally did not 
wipe out pre­Christian culture, leaving a rich repository of local folklore 
at the level of rural communities. Immersed in traditional culture, the 
peasantry was much longer isolated from external influences, and, con­
sequently, less susceptible to ideological bonds coming from the outside 
world. [13, pp. 187­188]. As a result, rural communities and their later 
kolkhoz and sovkhoz counterparts in the region remained largely ana­
tional, the consequences of which can be seen even today. Also, a gap 
between urban centres and rural areas and between educated elites and 
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rural masses has always been greater in the East than in the West. All 
these factors weakened the process of empowerment of the peasantry. 
Thus, the Russian nation (русский народ) resembles a sacralised com­
munity rather than a modern nation of the European type. In addition, 
as Daniel Beauvois stresses, Orthodox societies of tsarist Russia did not 
have such access to the school network as Catholic ones [1, pp. 369­370] 
and their level of literacy was lower [18, p. 172 passim], particularly 
in rural communities, which formed the overwhelming majority of the 
population of the region even after the Bolshevik revolution. This ham­
pered their national emancipation and social empowerment, and made 
them more inclined to become involved in class­oriented activity. As a 
result, in the Eastern Orthodox area, class ideology won the competition 
with national ideology, which triumphed in countries west of the Soviet 
Union after the First World War. 
(5) Drawing both on the concept of Holy Rus’ and on their sense of 
imperial mission, the Russians developed an idea of an all­Russian na­
tion, (общерусская нация), a community uniting Russians, Ukrainians 
and Belarusians, based on – as claimed in Russian historiography – their 
common origin, religion (Orthodoxy), culture (including the language) 
and historical past [14, passim]. While in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century the concept invoked an alleged political and ethnic community 
of Kievan Rus’, the second half of the nineteenth century saw attempts 
to create a consolidated Orthodox community of East Slavs by identify­
ing Rus’ness with Orthodoxy. This approach was extended to the ter­
ritories of the former Commonwealth, where the Greek Catholic Church 
had been abolished in 1839. As Belarusians did not develop their nation­
al elites until the end of the nineteenth century and the Ukrainian ones 
were still quite weak, the Belarusian and Ukrainian peasantry identified 
themselves with Rus’ness as promoted by Petersburg and Moscow. In 
the course of time, particularly after the land ownership reform and the 
abolition of serfdom, both peasant societies (at least 95% of Belarusians 
and Ukrainians in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century lived in ru­
ral areas) came to identify themselves with the powerful Orthodox state 
governed from Petersburg, and often took pride in the connection. This 
bond, existing at the level of the peasantry, which often still remained 
illiterate, could not be broken within a relatively short period of devel­
opment of the Ukrainian and Belarusian national movement in the early 
twentieth century. The prevailing attitude was to identify oneself as ‘an 
Orthodox, a Rus’, a member of a great community headed by the great 
tsar’. This identification continued even when Orthodoxy came to be 
113Серія «Культурологія». Випуск 16
replaced by communism and the tsar by communist rulers. For Russians, 
in turn, Ukraine and Belarus were a regional extension of their state and 
their sacralised community. 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the establishment of three separate 
and independent East Slavic republics brought the revival of national 
tendencies. In the 1990s, Andrzej Lazari observed that ‘Russian nation­
alism is bound together by a peculiar interpretation of history, which in­
volves tracing «proofs» to a claim that the Russian nation­state­religion 
has had a special mission to save the world or to introduce the «just» 
Russian order worldwide’ [10, p. 149]. As a result of social processes 
operating in the Soviet Union (and to a certain extent also in the tsarist 
Russia), Russianness is not clearly defined in terms of ethnicity or na­
tionality, but rather in terms of language and, most importantly, religion 
(which is obviously not meant here in the sense of individual religious 
practice). Its social and territorial extent is rather vague: in general per­
ception, as Rus’ness, it includes also Ukrainians and Belarusians; as 
Russianness (in the political sense), it tends to be extended to include 
the non­Slavic peoples of the Russian Federation. Attempts to combine 
the two options lead to conflicts, such as the one following the Maidan 
in Ukraine in 2014. 
Unlike the burgher ethos of the more urbanised West, the cultural­
political, sacralised dimension of Russianness is deeply rooted in peas­
ant culture, and its contents make it a Huntingtonian civilisation rather 
than an occidental nation. This stems not only from the nature of Rus­
sian culture and the course of the country’s history, but also from the 
backwardness of the tsarist era and the anational character of the Soviet 
Union. It is hardly surprising that Russian peasantry did not develop a 
national identity of the western type in the environment dominated by 
the Orthodox Rus’ness of the tsarist period or its Soviet cultural counter­
part. Although the urbanisation of the country in the Soviet era did not 
bring any major change in this respect, it does not mean that the same 
pattern is true for today’s Russia. Indeed, the country is going through 
the national (or even nationalist) process, involving the emergence of a 
number of organisations which promote views and mechanisms analogi­
cal, to a certain extent, to the historical pattern of European evolution. 
In today’s Russia, the Orthodox Church is held in high social esteem, 
as is the case also in Belarus and Ukraine. However, it is particularly 
Russia and Belarus where the Church is strongly connected with the 
state in terms of a hierarchical system of power. Andrzej Wierzbicki 
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observes that ‘[f]or the Orthodox Church, the most acceptable type of 
nationalism is its cultural variety, defining Russian culture in terms of 
past or present religious identity (not necessarily connected with actual 
religious practice), even though the Church does not officially use the 
term nationalism itself. Cultural nationalism fits the «civilisational ap­
proach». (…) As the Russian Orthodox Church does not want to be lim­
ited only to a national institution, it proposes a community broader than 
one based on ethnicity or political nationality: it is a community of ci­
vilisation built on the foundation of the Orthodox religion and Orthodox 
culture. (…) Defined in terms of Orthodox culture, Russian nationalism 
construes a hierarchy of nations and proposes a national identity based 
on Orthodox nationalism’3 [16, pp. 124­125]. 
3. orthodoxy in Belarus and ukraine
Although the roots of modern Belarusian and Russian Orthodoxy are 
certainly Russian, the entire cultural heritage involving the conflation of 
religion and Russianness which had emerged in the course of the evolu­
tion in the preceding centuries was not transposed onto Belarusian and 
Ukrainian society. In the Belarusian and Ukrainian territories of the for­
mer Polish­Lithuanian Commonwealth, Orthodoxy had been pushed out 
by the Greek Catholic Church. Its modern version spread there relative­
ly late, in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Uniate Church in 1839, 
becoming rooted only after the fall of the January Uprising (1863–1864) 
and the subsequent influx of Orthodox clergy from Russia. Previously, 
the area had been dominated by culturally westernised Uniate priests.
Towards the end of the eighteenth century (after the Third Parti­
tion of the Commonwealth), Belarusians did not have Orthodox elites, 
and the Bolshevik revolution brought an end both to the elites (whether 
Polish, Russian or, quite limited in terms of their number, Belarusian) 
and the elitist tradition as such. The period of tsarist rule was not long 
enough to enable the transfer of the entire wealth of Russian culture 
associated with Orthodoxy to the Belarusian peasantry, especially con­
3 ‘Some leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church try to promote a hier­
archy of religious and ethnic communities, whereby the state­making Or­
thodox nation is at the top, followed by the so­called traditional religions 
and their ethnic communities (Islam, Buddhism and Judaism) and the so­
called non­traditional ones (Catholicism and Protestantism)’ [16, p. 125, 
note 471].
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sidering that Belarusians had been exposed to the nation making process 
(generally involving a strong emotional dimension of culture and at­
tributing a sense of obligation to values) only to a very limited extent, 
even in the Russian understanding of the term. Following mass execu­
tions, Belarusian elites of the Soviet period included bureaucrats rather 
than intellectuals. Consequently, Belarusian (and Ukrainian) culture is 
not saturated with imperial attitudes and neither does it have a strongly 
sacral character typical of its Russian counterpart. On the other hand, it 
does include other elements of Russianness, such as a tendency to build 
vertical social structures, or submit to political power (both of them 
stemming, to an extent, from caesaropapism). 
Writing about the Donbas, the most Russified (and Sovietised) re­
gion of Ukraine (except for the Crimea), Oleksii Chupa observes that 
‘(...) the slogan «For the Holy Rus’» means nothing to an average Don­
bas person. On the other hand, it is a sacred phrase for a Russian, who 
was brought up on the chauvinist propaganda’ [6, pp. 35–36]. Although 
for the most part of the twentieth century both Belarus and Ukraine were 
exposed to Sovietisation and the Russian language was employed as a 
means in the process of indoctrination, it was not a factor of Russifica­
tion in terms of nationality, whatever the definition of the term.4 
Russia, along with Belarus and Ukraine, has been characterised by a 
considerable extent (much greater than, for example, in Poland) of the 
phenomenon which Edmund Wnuk­Lipiński refers to as ‘social dimor­
phism’ (or ‘dimorphism of values’), whereby the individual is oriented 
‘towards two parallel and distinct sets of values, depending whether he 
or she functions in the public or private sphere’, which means that the 
same person would have different attitudes and express different opin­
ions in public and in private [17, p. 45]. Thus, on the one hand, there is 
a clear domination of the political elite, coupled with a theatralisation 
and ideologisation of public life, in which public institutions only super­
ficially follow the western models. On the other hand, owing to a low 
level of empowerment, the overwhelming majority of society does not 
4 The term sometimes used in this context is ‘Russian civilisational 
nationalism’. Considering a specific (not entirely national) nature of the 
‘Russian civilisation’, I think that in situations involving extreme intensity 
of attitudes characterised by superiority and aggression (and based on a set 
of values which, as viewed by the Russians, define the Russian civilisa­
tion), a more adequate term would probably be ‘civilisational chauvinism’ 
or ‘imperial­cultural chauvinism’.
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engage in social activity. This situation is conducive to the spreading of 
rumour, conspiracy theories and to closing within primary groups. Al­
though the source of this phenomenon can be traced back mainly to the 
Soviet political reality, it was probably fostered also by Russian Ortho­
doxy with its traditional gap between the sacred, metaphysical, spiritual 
world of ideals, which defies rational reasoning, and the world of every­
day reality of mostly poor society subjected to generally quite ruthless 
power of the ruler.5 In the context of the Donbas conflict, the traditional 
gap between the authority and society is coupled with a sharp contrast 
between the propaganda and reality. 
It is interesting to observe that the longer the period under the So­
viet Union and tsarist Russia, the lower the general level of religious 
involvement of the Belarusian or Ukrainian Orthodox population. In 
Belarus, religious involvement is the highest in the western regions of 
the country, which belonged to Poland before the Second World War. 
The pattern is the same in Ukraine, both in the case of the Uniate region 
of Galicia and the Orthodox region of Volhynia, as well as in the Right 
Bank of the Dnieper, which belonged to the Commonwealth, as opposed 
to the Left Bank, and particularly to the former so­called New Russia. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Belarusian Orthodox community 
(just like its Ukrainian counterpart) experienced a phenomenon of reli­
gious revival. In atheised urban centres, the process sometimes takes the 
form of neophytism with all its typical consequences. By contrast, rural 
areas, not ideologised to a similar extent, were less given to emotional 
excitement in this sphere, more Orthodox, and Belarusian­speaking. 
It was the language (and a generally lower level of education than in 
towns) that functioned, to a certain extent, as a barrier inhibiting the 
diffusion of high Russian culture (in spite of widespread pro­Soviet and 
pro­Lukashenka attitudes) among the rural population. 
In Ukraine, the elites from the areas dominated by Russian Or­
thodoxy are less frequent to display their personal religious beliefs or 
manifest their religious affiliation in public than the Uniate elites from 
Galicia. Their counterparts from the central­eastern part of the country 
are traditionally urban, Russian­speaking, have Soviet identity and are 
characterised by a much weaker contact with rural culture, the source 
5 In regular surveys, Russia is generally characterised by the highest 
value of the Gini coefficient of income inequality among the European 
countries (always above the level of 0.40). This situation can be attributed 
to a number of factors.
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of Ukrainian identity. Western Ukraine is more attached to peasant tra­
ditions, has stronger connections between the urban centres and rural 
areas, and has a more consolidated national identity based on the Ukrai­
nian language.6 
In Belarus, the Orthodox population belongs to the Russian Ortho­
dox Church. Andrzej Mironowski comments that ‘Belarusian authori­
ties are currently opposing any attempts to make the Orthodox Church 
truly Belarusian’ [11, p. 309]. From the early days of its presence in 
Belarus in the nineteenth century, the Russian Orthodox Church (along 
with Petersburg and, later on, Moscow political authorities) has been the 
main instrument of assimilating Belarusianness and making it a cultural 
(or even national) extension of Russianness. By contrast, the founders 
of the Belarusian national movement were Catholics. They have also 
been clearly overrepresented in the national part of the political spec­
trum after 1991, even though a large proportion of Catholics in Belarus 
consider themselves as Poles. It can therefore be said that the Orthodox 
Church orients Belarus towards the East, which under the present cir­
cumstances hinders Belarusian national aspirations: as national separat­
ism breaks the cultural­national unity with the Russians, it is difficult to 
accept for the Church. On the other hand, the Catholic Church (whether 
Belarusian­ or Polish­oriented) leads Belarusians towards the West and 
thus, as it were, naturally consolidates their tendency to separate them­
selves from Moscow. This is particularly the case of Belarusian orienta­
tion within the Catholic Church which increasingly uses Belarusian as 
the language of liturgy. 
In Ukraine, the most pro­national stand is taken by the Ukrainian 
Greek Catholic Church, culturally oriented towards Europe and domi­
nating in Galicia. It displays the same attitude in Belarus, where, howev­
er, its presence is barely noticeable. Volhynia (where the population has 
a consolidated national identity) and the central regions of the country 
are dominated by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate, 
openly separatist from Moscow, supporting the Maidan in 2014 and the 
pro­European course in Ukraine. Holding opposite views, the Ukrai­
nian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate is influential mainly in 
the most Russified and Sovietised southern and eastern regions, which 
6 For these remarks on Ukraine, I am grateful to Mr Andrzej Jekaterynczuk 
from the Institute of Sociology at the Maria Curie­Skłodowska University 
in Lublin, currently working on his PhD thesis on Ukrainian collective 
identities.
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distanced themselves from the Second Maidan (2014). While its bishops 
and clergy are not uniform in their attitudes, the Church in general is in 
favour of cultural unity of Ukrainians and Russians. It is important to 
observe that while western Ukraine does not exceed 20% of the total 
population of the country, the ‘Maidan­camp’ (i.e. prior to the outbreak 
of violence) drew 42.4% of its participants from this region, and the cor­
responding figure for the ‘Maidan­Sich’ (i.e. in the period of violence in 
February 2014) was 54.8%7 [7, p. 162]. 
At the beginning of 2015, in Russia, the return to imperial tradition, 
a tendency gathering momentum for quite some time, is clearly visible, 
and the term imperialism itself is increasingly being used in a positive 
sense. It is a tradition of an Orthodox state, in which the Church is sub­
ordinated to political authority and promotes the imperial­nationalist 
values (which can be seen, for example, in the case of the Ukrainian 
conflict). Russia sees its aims in terms of consolidating ‘the Russian 
world’, and perceives itself as a civilisation threatened by the aggressive 
West. It is beyond doubt that the East Slavic area between Poland and 
Russia is currently a scene of a clash between the Western and Eastern 
circle of culture, or, as Russians firmly put it, the clash of civilisations. 
It is an objective process stemming from such factors as the economic 
inefficiency of the Russian model of state and society. 
Russian Orthodoxy is certainly not the only religion which petrifies 
a traditional vision of the world, although the extent of this phenomenon 
in Protestantism is far more limited. As such, in a number of aspects, it 
can be seen as the opposite of Sovietism. Obviously, Orthodox religious 
practices and strong parish structures are more conducive to building 
a community based on non­Soviet values, including, in some circum­
stances (autocephaly), also national ones. While Orthodoxy as such, 
7 According to Vakhtang Kipiani (the editor of ‘Istorychna Pravda’ 
(Historical Truth) website, a former television journalist and the former 
editor of the Ukrainian edition of Forbes magazine), in 1990, the Ukrainian 
Helsinki Union had 3,000 members, 2,300 of whom were from Galicia and 
the rest from other regions [8, s. 120]. Also, Rukh (the Popular Movement 
of Ukraine for Restructuring, established in 1989, the Ukrainian equiva­
lent of Sajudis in Lithuania and the Popular Fronts in the other two Baltic 
Republics) was founded mainly by activists from Galicia and Kiev, with 
communities of the eastern and southern regions underrepresented in the 
movement at the time.
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unlike Protestantism, does not display any prominent pro­modernising 
features, it can accompany the processes of modernisation, even if it 
plays no direct part in stimulating them. Thus, in present­day western 
and central Ukraine, the Orthodox church may become a factor in the 
process of separation from Moscow­defined Rus’ness, and building a 
sense of a new, anti­Soviet, national Ukrainian identity.
Translated from Polish by Piotr Styk
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